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1 Introduction
Decision-makers in real-world macroeconomies are necessarily limited to locally-constructive ac-
tions, that is, to actions constrained by their interaction networks, information, beliefs, and physical
states. In contrast, the actions of agents in current macroeconomic models are typically not lo-
cally constructive because they are constrained by externally imposed coordination and optimality
restrictions. Key examples include the global market clearing conditions and strong-form ratio-
nal expectations postulates imposed in standard dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE)
models based on Smets and Wouters (2003).
These observations raise the following important challenge. Suppose all actions within an otherwise
standard macroeconomic model are required to be locally constructive, unsupported by externally
imposed coordination and optimality restrictions. What form could these locally-constructive
actions take to ensure good outcomes, not only for the individual participants but also for the
macroeconomy as a whole?
This study addresses this challenge for a relatively simple macroeconomic model, referred to as the
Dynamic Macroeconomic (DM) Game. Consumers and ﬁrms in the DM Game interact over time
in labor and goods markets modeled as double auctions with uniform pricing rules. Each consumer
desires to maximize his expected intertemporal (lifetime) utility subject to budget constraints, and
each ﬁrm desires to maximize its expected intertemporal proﬁt subject to technology constraints.
However, in a departure from standard macroeconomic modeling, consumers and ﬁrms in the DM
Game are required to be constructively rational in the following sense. First, the speciﬁcation
by these agents of their objective functions, decision domains, and decision rules mapping deci-
sion domains into decision selections must be locally-constructive actions. Second, the successive
determination of DM-Game outcomes must be a purely historical process, unaided by externally
imposed coordination and optimality restrictions.
To investigate the implications of constructive rationality for the DM Game, the decision domains
for consumers and ﬁrms are expressed in stationary form, as vectors of possible parameter selec-
tions. In each successive time period an agent's selection of a decision (parameter vector) maps
into a sequence of parameterized supply and demand functions for current and future markets,
conditional on the agent's current information, beliefs, and physical state.
Computational experiments are then conducted in which consumers and ﬁrms make successive
selections from their decision domains in accordance with decision processes ranging from simple
adaptation to sophisticated anticipatory learning. These decision processes include: (i) a modi-
ﬁed version of a reactive reinforcement learning method originally developed by Roth and Erev
(1995) and Erev and Roth (1998) on the basis of ﬁndings from human-subject experiments; (ii) a
forward-looking learning method developed by Watkins (1989), called Q-learning; (iii) a forward-
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looking rolling-horizon learning method (Alden and Smith (1992)); and (iv) an adaptive dynamic
programming (ADP) learning method based on value-function approximation.
A key issue of interest is which decision-process combinations come closest to achieving the bench-
mark optimal solution obtainable by a fully informed social planner. In particular, do the decision
processes involving relatively more sophisticated use of information tend to result in relatively
higher welfare outcomes, either for the individual decision-makers or for the economy at large?
Since previous experimental ﬁndings have shown that minimally-informed traders using relatively
unsophisticated decision processes can match or exceed the performance of better informed traders
in some market contexts (Gode and Sunder (1993); Smith (2008)), the answer to this question is
not obvious a priori. A related issue of interest is which (if any) decision-process combinations
constitute Nash equilibria and/or Pareto optimal solutions for the DM Game.
A key ﬁnding of this study is that good performance in the DM Game requires decision-makers to
engage both in the exploitation of their current information and in searches for new information.
Simpler decision processes can outperform more sophisticated decision processes, but only if the
simpler processes entail memory lengths permitting some degree of adaptive foresight. Overall, the
best performance is achieved when the consumers and ﬁrms use rolling-horizon learning methods.
This study is organized as follows. The relationship of our work to previous research is more
carefully considered in Section 2, with a particular focus on learning in macroeconomic contexts.
Section 3 sets out the basic structure of the DM Game together with its market and payment
processes. Section 4 explains the decision processes implemented by the DM-Game consumers
and ﬁrms, and Section 5 introduces and solves the social planner model used as a benchmark
of comparison for our computational experiments. The sensitivity design for our computational
experiments is described in Section 6, and key ﬁndings from these computational experiments are
reported in Section 7. Section 8 concludes. Technical implementation aspects are relegated to the
Appendix, and the code is available at https://github.com/wilfeli/DMGameBasic.
2 Relationship to Previous Research
Numerous previous researchers have emphasized the importance and complexity of modeling real-
world decision processes. Examples include Simon (1978), Dosi and Egidi (1991), Stiglitz (2002),
Smith (2008), Howitt (2008), Kahneman (2011), Kirman (2011), Hommes (2013), and Arthur
(2015). Practitioners have also been interested in obtaining an improved understanding of these
processes; see, e.g., a recent report issued by Trichet (2010), a former President of the European
Central Bank.
Current macroeconomic models are surely complex. For example, standard DSGE models typically
include consumers and ﬁrms that solve intertemporal utility and proﬁt maximization problems
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subject to intertemporal constraints, conditional on announced government policy rules; see, for
example, Sbordone et al. (2010) and Tovar (2009). Yet, to avoid aggregation and coordination
issues, these models also typically assume the existence of representative consumer and ﬁrm agents
with strong forms of rational expectations. This reliance on representative agents with rational
expectations has been criticized on the grounds it prevents the study of learning and coordination
issues critical for understanding the operation of real-world macroeconomies (Howitt (2012)).
Recently, however, a growing number of researchers have become interested in the study of dy-
namic macroeconomic systems for which agents are forward-looking optimizers with incomplete
knowledge about the structure of the economy. As surveyed in Honkapohja et al. (2012) and Evans
and Honkapohja (2013), the standard context assumed in this literature is that a representative
consumer1 with learning capabilities resides in a dynamic world consisting of itself, a representative
ﬁrm, and a government policy-maker. The representative consumer has incomplete information
about the structure of its world, and it behaves as an econometrician in its attempts to learn about
its world from observed data.
Speciﬁcally, the representative consumer is assumed to make consumption and labor decisions
in each successive time period conditional on intertemporal budget constraints. These budget
constraints depend on current state variables (e.g., ﬁnancial and physical asset values), on current
and forecasted future values for system variables (e.g., goods prices, wages, and interest rates),
and on current and forecasted future values for government policy variables (e.g., tax rates). The
consumer's system variable forecasts are obtained from a reduced-form econometric model. The
consumer estimates and updates the parameters of this econometric model over time, often by
means of a least-squares or Bayesian learning method. The consumer's government policy variable
forecasts are generated by means of the latest announced government policy rule, assumed to be
credible common knowledge.
Functional forms and calibrated maintained parameter values are speciﬁed in the initial time
period to guarantee the existence of a steady-state solution, assumed to be common knowledge.
A temporary equilibrium solution for the macroeconomic model is then approximately determined
in diﬀerenced form (i.e., diﬀerenced from steady-state values) in each successive time period.
The approximate temporary equilibrium solution in any current time period is generally obtained
as follows. Consumer and ﬁrm ﬁrst-order necessary conditions for optimality are linearized around
steady-state values subject to transversality, no-arbitrage, and no-ponzi-game restrictions. This
permits diﬀerenced demand and supply decision variables to be expressed as linear aﬃne functions
of diﬀerenced current state variables, diﬀerenced current system variables, diﬀerenced current gov-
ernment policy variables, and current exogenous random shocks. For the representative consumer
1Some researchers assume a compact continuum of consumers exhibiting some degree of heterogeneity in their
preferences for consumption versus leisure; see, e.g., Milani (2005). However, eﬃcient risk-sharing arrangements are
then typically assumed so that the consumers in fact face identical intertemporal budget constraints and behave
the same in equilibrium, eﬀectively reducing the economy to a representative consumer economy.
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with forward-looking learning capabilities, the linearized expressions for its diﬀerenced decision
variables also include additive terms depending on forecasted diﬀerenced values for future system
variables, future government policy variables, and future shock realizations.
Period-t market clearing conditions are then imposed to obtain temporary equilibrium solutions for
diﬀerenced period-t decision and system variables as linear aﬃne functions of diﬀerenced period-
t state variables and realized period-t shock terms. These solutions are used in turn to derive
diﬀerenced state variable solutions for period t+1, in preparation for the determination of an
approximate temporary equilibrium solution for period t+1.2
One key issue addressed in this literature is whether the temporary equilibrium solution path condi-
tional on a particular learning speciﬁcation exhibits convergence or escape dynamics (Honkapohja
et al. (2012); Evans and Honkapohja (2013)). That is, will it converge over time to the steady-
state solution (in either a global or local stability sense), or will it persistently deviate from this
solution?
A second key issue is how diﬀerent learning speciﬁcations aﬀect the dynamic properties (e.g., per-
sistence and volatility) of the temporary equilibrium solution path, taking the dynamic properties
of this solution path under rational expectations as a benchmark of comparison (Milani (2005,
2007)). A third key issue, studied in Mitra et al. (2013) for a real business cycle model, is how
the temporary equilibrium solution path is aﬀected by a sudden, permanent, credibly-announced
switch in the government's policy rule. A fourth key issue, explored at length in Hommes (2013), is
how temporary equilibrium solutions are aﬀected when agents are modeled as adaptive forecasters
with heterogeneous beliefs and expectations.
Clearly this literature takes an important step towards more realistic macroeconomic modeling by
recognizing the constrained information and computational capabilities of decision-making agents.
Nevertheless, external coordination and optimality conditions are still imposed on agents (both
intertemporally and cross-sectionally) in order to obtain model solutions. Examples of such con-
ditions include: single representative consumer (or ﬁrm) assumptions; the assumed coordination
of agents on a single solution; non-constructive transversality conditions; the assumed absence of
interest-rate arbitrage opportunities; the assumed absence of ponzi-game opportunities such as
persistent debt roll-over; and the assumed absence of excess supplies and demands in markets.
An alternative approach permitting the systematic study of locally-constructive decision processes
in macroeconomic contexts without reliance on the external imposition of coordination and op-
timality conditions is Agent-based Computational Economics (ACE). Under the ACE approach,
economic processes (including whole economies) are computationally modeled as open-ended dy-
namic systems of interacting agents (Tesfatsion and Judd (2006); LeBaron and Tesfatsion (2008);
2Researchers in this dynamic macroeconomic learning literature are increasingly resorting to models expressed
directly in terms of these reduced-form linear aﬃne relationships. For example, compare the working paper (Milani,
2005) with its later published version (Milani, 2007).
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Tesfatsion (2015c); Arthur (2015)). Here agent can refer to any physical, biological, social, or
institutional entity residing within the system.
An ACE model is an historical process model in the following sense: Outcomes are determined in
each successive time period based solely on current agent interactions, conditional on current state
conditions and current exogenous shock realizations. These successive agent interactions give rise
to global regularities characterizing the system as a whole, which in turn aﬀect agent interactions.
ACE macroeconomic research to date has typically postulated decision rules for decision-making
agents that are not explicitly derived as solutions for optimization problems, although they are
sometimes motivated as heuristic approximations for such solutions. Examples include Oeﬀner
(2008), Dosi et al. (2010), Mandel et al. (2010), Kirman (2011), Salle et al. (2013), Salle and
Seppecher (2013), and Dawid et al. (2015).3 This has led some macroeconomists to dismiss ACE
modeling based on the incorrect belief that ACE decision-making agents must necessarily be reac-
tive stimulus-response agents with myopic objectives.
To the contrary, however, the behaviors expressed by decision-making agents in ACE models can
range all the way from simple rule-based actions to intertemporal optimization with sophisticated
anticipatory learning capabilities.4 We thus argue that it would be a Pareto improvement to
expand the standard macroeconomic toolkit to include ACE as another potentially useful modeling
approach.
More precisely, any modeling approach will have both advantages and disadvantages for a particu-
lar purpose at hand. For some purposes, imposing external coordination and optimality conditions
on decision-making agents could be a perfectly acceptable short-cut. For other purposes it could be
important to understand potential outcomes when decision-making agents are constrained to op-
erate within a purely historical process subject to realistically rendered informational and physical
limitations. The adoption of ACE modeling for these latter purposes does not require decision-
makers to be irrational.
The primary goal of the current study is to provide concrete support for the above assertions within
the context of a relatively simple ACE macroeconomic model, which we refer to as the Dynamic
Macroeconomic (DM) Game. As will be demonstrated more carefully in subsequent sections, the
DM Game diﬀers from existing macroeconomic models in four key respects:
(D1): Each consumer and ﬁrm in the DMGame is a learning agent with an intertemporal objective
that it attempts to achieve by successive implementation of a decision process.
3See Chen (2012) for a survey of ACE agent modeling, and see Tesfatsion (2015a) for extensive annotated
pointers to ACE macroeconomic research.
4For an extensive collection of annotated pointers to research on learning algorithms for ACE agents, including
approximate dynamic programming and other forward-looking methods for intertemporal optimization, see Tesfat-
sion (2015b).
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(D2): The decision process used by each learning agent in the DM Game is locally constructive.
(D3): The DM Game is an historical process model.
(D4): In the DM Game, heterogeneity in the information, beliefs, and physical states of agents
changes endogenously over time through the natural course of market participations.
A ﬁnal note on terminology is in order. Our conception of constructive rationality does not
necessarily entail the pursuit of goals solely through the solution of optimization problems. Con-
sequently, it diﬀers from the concept of procedural rationality introduced by Simon (1978, p. 9),
in which decision-making agents are assumed to pursue the most eﬀective possible processes for
the choices of their actions, given their limited information and cognitive powers. Similarly, it
diﬀers from the concept of constructivist rationality introduced by Smith (2008, p. 2), deﬁned as
the deliberate use of reason to analyze and prescribe actions judged to be better than alternative
feasible actions that might be chosen.
Rather, our conception permits procedural uncertainty (Dosi and Egidi (1991); Howitt (2008)),
in the sense that decision-makers might be uncertain how to use their limited decision-making
resources in an attempt to achieve their goals. In this case they might engage in a combined
learning and decision process in an attempt to reduce their uncertainty about their world even as
they attempt to survive and prosper within that world.
Indeed, the operative question for a reader of this study is as follows: If you were to be suddenly
transported into the DM Game as a consumer or ﬁrm, forced to implement your decisions in a
locally-constructive manner, what decision process would you use in an attempt to achieve your
utility or proﬁt goal?
3 The Dynamic Macroeconomic Game
3.1 Overview
This section develops the Dynamic Macroeconomic (DM) Game, a relatively simple dynamic
macroeconomic model that will permit us to investigate the eﬀects on micro and macro out-
comes when consumers and ﬁrms with intertemporal utility and proﬁt goals implement various
types of decision processes in an attempt to achieve these goals. The basic structure of the DM
Game is similar to the structure of standard dynamic macroeconomic models. However, as noted
in Section 2, the DM Game diﬀers from these standard models in four key respects: (D1) multi-
ple consumers and ﬁrms with learning capabilities; (D2) locally-constructive decision rules; (D3)
absence of externally-imposed coordination and optimality conditions; and (D4) endogenous het-
erogeneity.
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Conditions (D1) through (D3) imply that events must proceed through historical time from cause to
eﬀect, with no non-causal looping permitted. In particular, the standard determination of market
outcomes, in which labor and goods markets are simultaneously cleared at correct equilibrium
prices with correct matching of buyers and sellers, with no risk to the traders, must be replaced by
market processes permitting risky trades to proceed even if transactions are based on imperfectly
informed demands and supplies.
Regarding (D4), heterogeneity among the DM-Game consumers and among the DM-Game ﬁrms
arises endogenously over time from three sources. One source is that all of the decision processes
tested for consumers and ﬁrms in this study are adaptive processes involving stochastic aspects
in their implementations. A second source is that consumers and ﬁrms use coin ﬂips to resolve
indiﬀerence among decision options. A third source is that the rules governing labor and goods
market operations include stochastic rationing rules to resolve excess demand and supply situations.
Section 3.2 provides a big-picture understanding of the basic DM-Game structure. Sections 3.3
through 3.5 then explain in greater detail the market and payment processes in the DM Game,
as well as the structure of the intertemporal optimization problems for consumers and ﬁrms. A
detailed description of the particular locally-constructive decision processes to be tested for the
consumers and ﬁrms by means of computational experiments is given in the following Section 4.
3.2 Basic DM-Game Structure
As depicted in Fig. 1, the DM Game consists of a ﬁnite number I of utility-seeking inﬁnitely-lived
consumers and a ﬁnite number J of proﬁt-seeking inﬁnitely-lived corporate ﬁrms that interact in
market and payment processes over discrete time periods t ≥ 0, where period t = [t, t+ 1).
Figure 1: Decision-making agents and institutions for the DM Game
Each consumer and ﬁrm has an initial money balance at time 0, measured in book credit; and all
subsequent payments and receipts take the form of changes in consumer and ﬁrm money balances.
The consumers derive utility from leisure and from the consumption of a durable good q purchased
from ﬁrms. The ﬁrms earn proﬁts from the sale of good q to consumers, where q is produced by
means of labor services purchased from consumers.
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Both the labor market and the goods market are organized as automated double-auction exchanges
in which demands and supplies are matched to determine market-clearing prices and quantities.
Firm proﬁts are distributed back to consumers in the form of dividend payments. The goal of
each consumer is to maximize his expected intertemporal utility subject to budget constraints,
where this optimization problem is expressed in locally-constructive terms. The goal of each ﬁrm
is to maximize its expected intertemporal proﬁts subject to technology constraints, where this
optimization problem is expressed in locally-constructive terms.
Each consumer at time 0 is structurally identical to each other consumer; that is, each consumer
has the same initial money balance, human capital endowment, and intertemporal utility function.
Also, each consumer owns an equal share of each ﬁrm, ﬁxed through time, and hence receives the
same stream of dividend payments. Similarly, each ﬁrm at time 0 is structurally identical to each
other ﬁrm, meaning that each ﬁrm has the same initial money balance, goods stock, production
function, intertemporal proﬁt function, and dividend allocation rule.
Market trades in the DM Game are risky in the following sense. In each period the labor market
occurs prior to the goods market. Firms engage in forward contracting with consumers for labor
services, and carry out goods production using these labor services, prior to the realization of
actual goods demands. Firms thus risk bankruptcy if insuﬃcient goods are sold to permit them
to meet their wage obligations, and bankrupt ﬁrms must exit the DM-Game economy. Since there
is no entry mechanism for ﬁrms, the bankruptcy of ﬁrms can ultimately lead to the collapse of the
economy.
When ﬁrms are forced to exit the DM Game due to bankruptcy, the remaining ﬁrms do not
immediately modify their behavior to take into account that they now have a larger share of the
market. However, as will be seen in Section 4, all of our tested decision processes involve adaptation
to changing state conditions. Consequently, the exit of bankrupt ﬁrms will eventually result in
changes in the decisions of the remaining ﬁrms to the extent that this bankruptcy aﬀects their
state conditions.
Consumers risk non-payment for labor services rendered if ﬁrms become bankrupt. Since all goods
demands must be backed by actual purchasing power, this can reduce the goods demands of the
consumers in the next trading period, exacerbating ﬁrm cash-ﬂow problems. However, consumers
can survive even if their market purchases of consumption goods are zero because they can obtain
their basic subsistence needs through non-traded means (e.g., a garden patch).
A key question to be addressed is therefore as follows. Given the potential riskiness of market
trading, and the restriction to locally-constructive decision processes, is it worthwhile for the
consumers and ﬁrms to use relatively sophisticated decision processes derived from intertemporal
optimizations? Or should they instead proceed cautiously with simpler forms of decision processes
based on incremental adaptations to past trading outcomes?
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3.3 Market and Payment Processes in the DM Game
All transactions in the DM Game are accompanied by corresponding payments, hence the payment
system is an important underlying institution. For simplicity, this payment system is taken to be a
simple clearing house that instantaneously clears each transaction. Although consumers and ﬁrms
can carry forward savings in the form of money (book-credit), there is no banking system, hence
no borrowing/lending opportunities and no interest paid on savings.
A consumer is not permitted to spend more than his current money balance, hence all consumer
demands for goods must be backed by actual purchasing power. A ﬁrm is declared bankrupt, and
removed from the economy, if its current money balance is insuﬃcient to meet its wage-payment
obligations to its workers.5
The consumers and ﬁrms use decision processes in each period t in an attempt to take actions that
satisfy their intertemporal utility and proﬁt goals, conditional on current expectations for future
wages and goods prices. These actions consist of both labor and goods market decisions, such as
whether or not to participate in these markets and what speciﬁc quantity and price terms to seek
if they do.
The consumers and ﬁrms receive feedback from the economy as a result of their period-t actions,
and they update their decision processes on the basis of this feedback in preparation for period t+1.
This feedback includes market-clearing wages and prices for the period-t labor and goods markets,
and their own private utility or proﬁt outcomes as a result of their period-t market transactions.
Figure 2: Sequential market decisions during a typical period t.
As depicted in Fig. 2, the labor market occurs before the goods market in each period t. Each
consumer participating in the labor market submits a labor supply oﬀer, and each ﬁrm participating
in the labor market submits a labor demand bid. A labor market clearing solution is then calculated
based on these oﬀers and bids. This solution consists of a set of forward labor contracts (supply
5Any money held by a bankrupt ﬁrm is divided equally among its workers in partial fulﬁllment of its wage-
payment obligations. However, goods stocks of bankrupt ﬁrms are assumed to be lost to the economy.
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now, get paid later) that determine the amount of labor to be supplied now by each consumer to
each ﬁrm, and the (common) wage to be paid later by the ﬁrms to the consumers for each unit of
supplied labor.
After the close of the period-t labor market, the consumers perform labor for the ﬁrms in accordance
with their forward labor contracts, which results in produced amounts of goods. Next, each
consumer participating in the period-t goods market submits a goods demand bid, and each ﬁrm
participating in the period-t goods market submits a goods supply oﬀer. A goods market clearing
solution is then calculated based on these bids and oﬀers. This solution consists of a set of spot
contracts that determine the amount of good to be received now by each consumer from each ﬁrm,
and the (common) goods price to be paid now by the consumers to the ﬁrms for each unit of good
received.
After the close of the period-t goods market, each ﬁrm proceeds to deliver goods to its customers
in return for goods payments in accordance with its period-t goods market spot contracts. Each
ﬁrm then settles its period-t wage-payment obligations to its workers as determined by its period-t
forward labor contracts, if it has a suﬃcient money balance to cover these obligations. Otherwise,
the ﬁrm is bankrupt and must exit the economy.
At the end of period t, each consumer calculates its period-t utility on the basis of its period-t
consumption of market-procured goods and leisure. Also, each (non-bankrupt) ﬁrm calculates
its period-t proﬁt as its period-t goods-sales revenues minus its period-t wage payments. These
period-t utility and proﬁt outcomes are used by the consumers and ﬁrms to update their decision
processes for period t+ 1.
A portion of any positive proﬁts accrued by a ﬁrm during period t is distributed to the ﬁrm's
consumer-owners as dividend payments at the end of period t. The wage and dividend payments
received by a consumer from the ﬁrms at the end of period t, together with any other unspent
monies held by the consumer at the end of period t, constitute the money balance of the consumer
at the start of period t+ 1 to be used for goods purchases in period t+ 1.
This ﬂow of events is illustrated in Fig. 3. Note the use of internal times t:1 through t:6 for events
occurring within each period t = [t, t + 1). The money balances held by consumers and ﬁrms at
the end of period t (i.e., at time t + 1) are determined by the money balances held by consumers
and ﬁrms at the start of period t together with the additions and subtractions to these money
balances arising from period-t market and dividend payments.
Finally, as detailed below in Sections 4.2 and 4.3, reservation wages and prices are used to determine
demand and supply functions in the DM Game. Agents thus abruptly enter or drop out of the labor
and goods markets as the wage and price increase from 0, which induces vertical and horizontal
portions in the aggregate demand and supply functions.
If the aggregate demand and supply functions coincide along a vertical portion, there will be
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Figure 3: Flow of events during a typical period t.
multiple possible equilibrium prices corresponding to a unique equilibrium quantity. In this case,
market rules impose the selection of the maximum possible equilibrium price.
If the aggregate demand and supply functions coincide along a horizontal portion, there will be
multiple possible equilibrium quantities corresponding to a unique equilibrium price. In this case,
market rules impose a simple stochastic rationing mechanism: namely, the agents that are willing
to trade at this unique equilibrium price are allowed to trade in random order. Trading stops when
no more trades are possible, at which point the maximum possible equilibrium quantity has been
cleared. At such equilibrium points there will typically be traders willing but unable to purchase
more goods (excess demand) or traders willing but unable to supply more goods (excess supply).
3.4 Consumer Constraints and Goals in the DM Game
Consumers in the DM Game are structurally identical at the initial time 0. Each consumer i is
endowed with the same initial positive money balance M c−1 (in book credit form). Each consumer
i also has one unit of time in each period r ≥ 0 that can be divided between labor lci,r:1 and leisure
[1− lci,r:1]. To simplify the analysis, it is assumed that this one unit of time is allocated either all
to labor or all to leisure.
Ignoring uncertainties (for the moment), the budget constraints faced by each consumer i in each
period r ≥ 0 take the following form:
si,r:3 = M
c
i,r−1 − pr:3qci,r:3 (1)







i,r:3 ≥ 0 (3)
lci,r:1 ∈ {0, 1} (4)
HereM ci,r−1 denotes consumer i's money balance at the start of period r, pr:3 denotes the goods price
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determined in the goods market at time r:3 (same for all consumers), qci,r:3 denotes the amount
of good purchased by consumer i in the goods market at time r:3, si,r:3 denotes the savings of
consumer i immediately subsequent to the goods market at time r:3, wi,r:4l
c
i,r:1 denotes the actual
wage payment received by consumer i at time r:4 arising from its forward labor contract cleared
in the labor market at time r:1, and divcr:5 denotes the dividend payment (same for all consumers)
received by consumer i at time r:5. The non-negativity constraint si,r:3 ≥ 0 ensures that consumer
i's goods purchase qci,r:3 is backed by actual purchasing power (money holdings).
The goal of each consumer i at the start of each period t ≥ 0 is to maximize his expected intertem-
poral utility over periods r ≥ t subject to budget constraints (1)-(4) for periods r ≥ t. If the labor
service and consumption levels of consumer i in periods r ≥ t are given by {lci,r:1, qci,r:3}∞r=t , then









where β ∈ (0, 1) is a time-preference discount parameter.
In summary, as detailed above, the constraints and goals of the consumers in the DM Game depend
commonly on the speciﬁc settings for (M c−1, u(·), β) at the initial time 0. However, consumers do
not know in advance the decision processes in use by ﬁrms and other consumers, hence they
do not know in advance the market-clearing values for future goods prices and wages nor the
extent to which their own future goods demands and labor supplies will be fulﬁlled. How each
consumer i might address this uncertainty through various alternative speciﬁcations for its own
locally-constructive decision process will be explained in Section 4.
3.5 Firm Constraints and Goals in the DM Game
Firms in the DM Game are structurally identical at the initial time 0. Each ﬁrm j is endowed with
the same initial positive money balanceM f−1 (in book credit form) and the same initial goods stock
qstock−1 . Also, each ﬁrm j has the same stationary production function q = F (l) for the production
of good q using labor services l. Ignoring uncertainties (for the moment), the constraints faced by
each ﬁrm j in each period r ≥ 0 are derived as follows.
Let qstockj,r−1 denote ﬁrm j's goods inventory at the start of period r ≥ 0. Suppose ﬁrm j purchases
labor services lfj,r:1 in the time-r:1 labor market and uses these labor services to produce a goods
amount qfj,r:2 = F (l
f
j,r:1) at time r:2. The goods amount q
f
j,r:3 that ﬁrm j sells in the time-r:3 goods
market cannot exceed its time r:2 goods inventory, qstockj,r:2 , which is given by its goods inventory at





j,r:2 ≥ qfj,r:3 (6)
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j,r:2 − qfj,r:3 (7)
In addition, ﬁrm j must worry about avoiding bankruptcy, since bankrupt ﬁrms (i.e., ﬁrms unable
to meet their wage obligations) must exit the DM-Game economy. Consequently, ﬁrm j only
distributes dividends in period r if its goods market revenues pr:3q
f
j,r:3 earned at time r:3 exceed
its wage obligations wj,r:1l
f
j,r:1 incurred in the forward labor market at time r:1 for settlement at
time r:4. Moreover, ﬁrm j limits its dividend distributions to its proﬁts (if any). Speciﬁcally, ﬁrm











j,r:3 − wr:1lfj,r:1 ≥ 0
0 otherwise
(8)
where κdiv ∈ [0, 1]. Given (8), the no-bankruptcy condition for ﬁrm j in period r guaranteeing its
period-r wage obligations can be fulﬁlled takes the form
M fj,r−1 + pr:3q
f
j,r:3 − wr:1lfj,r:1 ≥ 0 (9)
The money balance M fj,r held by a non-bankrupt ﬁrm j at the end of period r (i.e., at the start of
period r + 1) is determined by the money balance M fj,r−1 held by ﬁrm j at the start of period r
adjusted to reﬂect ﬁrm j's market activities and dividend payments during period r, as follows:




j,r:3 − wr:1lfj,r:1 − divfj,r:5 (10)
Finally, the following non-negativity restrictions on ﬁrm j's labor demand lfj,r:1 at time r:1 and
goods supply qfj,r:3 at time r:3 must be satisﬁed for physical meaningfulness:
lfj,r:1, q
f
j,r:3 ≥ 0 (11)
The goal of each ﬁrm j at the start of each period t ≥ 0 is to maximize its expected intertemporal
proﬁt over periods r ≥ t subject to the technological and feasibility constraints (6)-(11) for periods









of wage levels, labor service purchases,
goods prices, and goods purchases for periods r ≥ t, the intertemporal proﬁt attained by ﬁrm j
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where µ ∈ (0, 1) is a time-preference discount parameter.
In summary, as detailed above, the constraints and goals of the ﬁrms in the DM Game depend
commonly on the speciﬁc settings for (M f−1, q
stock
−1 , F (·), µ, κdiv) at the initial time 0. However, ﬁrms
do not know in advance the decision processes in use by consumers and other ﬁrms, hence they
do not know in advance the market-clearing values for wages and goods prices nor the extent to
which their own future labor supplies and goods demands will be fulﬁlled. How each ﬁrm j might
address this uncertainty through various alternative speciﬁcations for its own locally-constructive
decision process will be explained in the following Section 4.
4 Locally-Constructive Decision Processes
4.1 Overview of Decision Processes
The locally-constructive decision processes speciﬁed for consumers and ﬁrms in the DM Game are
procedures for the adaptive determination of demand bids and supply oﬀers for the labor and goods
markets in each successive period t. These decision processes consist of three distinct components,
as follows.
First, decision domains are speciﬁed for consumers and ﬁrms that consist of possible selections of
tuning parameters for demand and supply functions. To permit more meaningful comparisons
among decision processes, the decision domain for each consumer at the start of each period t is
speciﬁed as a cross-product Dc of ﬁnite sets, the same for each consumer. Similarly, the decision
domain for each ﬁrm at the start of each period t is speciﬁed as a cross-product Df of ﬁnite sets,
the same for each ﬁrm.
Second, state-conditioned transformation functions are speciﬁed for consumers and ﬁrms. The
state of a consumer or ﬁrm at any time t consists of the time-t information, beliefs, and physical
attributes of this agent. The transformation function for each consumer at the start of each period
t ≥ 0 maps each of his possible decisions dc in Dc into a collection of labor supply and goods
demand functions for periods r ≥ t, parameterized by dc, and conditional on the consumer's time-t
state. Similarly, the transformation function for each ﬁrm at the start of each period t ≥ 0 maps
each of its possible decisions df in Df into a collection of labor demand and goods supply functions
for periods r ≥ t, parameterized by df , and conditional on the ﬁrm's time-t state.
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Third, Reactive Learner (RL), Forward-looking Learner (FL), and Explicit Optimizer (EO) decision
rules are speciﬁed for each consumer and ﬁrm that determine how this agent selects decisions from
its decision domain in each period t. These three types of decision rules cover a range of decision-
making behaviors roughly ordered from less to more sophisticated with regard to information
utilization, expectation formation, and forward-looking behavior. A summary description of these
decision-rule types is given in Table 1.
Agent Decision-Rule Type Decision-Rule Description
Consumer Reactive Learner (RL) Adaptively updates decisions in response to
realized utility outcomes
Forward-Looking Learner (FL) Uses Q-learning in an attempt to maximize
expected intertemporal utility
Explicit Optimizer (EO) Maximizes expected intertemporal utility using
adaptively updated probabilities
Firm Reactive Learner (RL) Adaptively updates decisions in response to
realized proﬁt outcomes
Forward-Looking Learner (FL) Uses Q-learning in an attempt to maximize
expected intertemporal proﬁt
Explicit Optimizer (EO) Maximizes expected intertemporal proﬁt using
adaptively updated probabilities
Table 1: Types of decision rules for consumers and ﬁrms in the DM Game.
The construction of the decision domains and the state-conditioned transformation functions for
consumers and ﬁrms is explained more carefully in Section 4.2 and Section 4.3. Detailed descrip-
tions of the three decision-rule types RL, FL, and EO listed in Table 1 are provided in Section 4.4
through Section 4.6.
4.2 Decision Domain and Transformation Function for Consumers
The decision domain Dc for each consumer i at the start of each period t is given by a cross-product
of ﬁnite sets having the form
Dc = Lc ⊗ Ω⊗Θ (13)
where:
 Lc = {0, 1}
 the elements of Ω = {ω1, . . . , ωG} satisfy 0 < ω1 < . . . < ωG
 the elements of Θ = {θ1, . . . , θH} satisfy 0 ≤ θ1 < . . . < θH ≤ 1
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Consumer i selects a decision d = (lc, ω, θ) from Dc at each time t ≥ 0 by means of its particular
RL, FL, or EO decision rule. The selection of d at time t is then transformed into a sequence
TRci,t(d) of labor supply and goods demand functions (l
c
i,r:1(w, d, t), q
c
i,r:3(p, d, t))r≥t, parameterized
by d and conditional on consumer i's time-t state.
Speciﬁcally, the labor supply lci,r:1(w, d, t) as a function of the time-r:1 labor market wage w is
determined as follows. If lc = 0, then lci,r:1(w, d, t) = 0 for all wages w, meaning that consumer
i does not plan to participate in the time-r:1 labor market. On the other hand, if lc = 1, the
reservation wage of consumer i for the time-r:1 labor market, calculated from the vantage point
of the current time t, is given by
wci,r:1(d, t) = ω · Ei,t[wr:1] (14)
where Ei,t[wr:1] denotes the time-r:1 labor market wage expected by consumer i, based on his state
at time t.6 The parameter ω in (14) determines the scale of each consumer's reservation wage
relative to his expected wage.
The reservation wage wci,r:1(d, t) in (14) has the standard meaning that it is the lowest wage
that consumer i expects at time t to be willing to accept for his oﬀered labor at time r:1. If
w < wci,r:1(d, t), then l
c
i,r:1(w, d, t) = 0, meaning that consumer i does not plan to participate in
the time-r:1 labor market at the labor market wage w. On the other hand, if w ≥ wci,r:1(d, t), then
lci,r:1(w, d, t) = 1, meaning that consumer i plans to oﬀer his 1 unit of labor into the time-r:1 labor
market at the labor market wage w.
Also, the goods demand qci,r:3(p, d, t) as a function of the time-r:3 goods market price p takes the
form
p · qci,r:3(p, d, t) = θ ·M ci,r−1 (15)
Thus, consumer i plans in period t to spend a fraction θ of his time-r money balance M ci,r−1 on
consumption goods at time r:3, and he speciﬁes his time-r:3 goods demand as a function of the
time-r:3 market price p in accordance with this plan. Note that M ci,r−1 will be known to consumer
i at time r, prior to the opening of the goods market at time r:3.7
The decision domain Dc depends on the grid speciﬁcations for Ω and Θ; these grid speciﬁcations
are explained in Appendix A. The transformation function TRci,t depends on the wage expectation
in (14). The method used by consumers to form and update their wage expectations is explained
in Appendix B.
6Without loss of generality, the reservation wage (14) could be expressed in real terms by dividing each side of
(14) by the expected goods price at time r:1, where this price expectation is formed at the current time t.
7Recall that consumer i receives no money payments between time r (the start of period r) and the settlement
of labor market contracts at time r:4. Thus, consumer i's purchases in the time-r:3 goods market cannot exceed
his money balance M ci,r−1 at time r.
17
4.3 Decision Domain and Transformation Function for Firms
The decision domain Df for each ﬁrm j at the start of each period t is given by a cross-product of
ﬁnite sets having the form
Df = Lf ⊗ Γ⊗ Λ⊗Ψ (16)
where:
 the elements of Lf = {lf1 , . . . , lfL} satisfy 0 ≤ lf1 < . . . < lfL
 the elements of Γ = {γ1, . . . , γM} satisfy 0 < γ1 < . . . < γM
 the elements of Λ = {λ1, . . . , λN} satisfy 0 < λ1 < . . . < λN
 the elements of Ψ = {ψ1, . . . , ψR} satisfy 0 ≤ ψ1 < . . . < ψR ≤ 1
Firm j selects a decision d = (lf , γ, λ, ψ) from Df at each time t ≥ 0 by means of its particular RL,
FL, or EO decision rule. The selection of d at time t is then transformed into a sequence TRfj,t(d)
of labor demand and goods supply functions (lfj,r:1(w, d, t), q
f
j,r:3(p, d, t))r≥t, parameterized by d and
conditional on ﬁrm j's time-t state.
Speciﬁcally, the labor demand lfj,r:1(w, d, t) as a function of the time-r:1 labor market wage w is
determined as follows. If lf = 0, then lfj,r:q(w, d, t) = 0 for all w, meaning that ﬁrm j does not
plan to participate in the time-r:1 labor market. If lf > 0, the reservation wage of ﬁrm j for the
time-r:1 labor market is given by
wfj,r:1(d, t) = γ · Ej,t[wr:1] (17)
where Ej,t[wr:1] denotes the time-r:1 labor market wage expected by ﬁrm j, based on its state at
time t.8 The parameter γ in (17) determines the scale of ﬁrm j's reservation wage relative to its
expected wage.
The reservation wage (17) has the standard meaning that it is the highest wage that ﬁrm j expects
at time t to be willing to pay for its demanded labor at time r:1. If w > wfj,r:1(d, t), then l
f
j,r:1(w, d, t)
= 0, meaning that ﬁrm j does not plan to participate in the time-r:1 labor market at the labor
market wage w. On the other hand, if w ≤ wfj,r:1(d, t), then lfj,r:1(w, d, t) = lf , meaning that ﬁrm j
plans to demand lf units of labor in the time-r:1 labor market at the labor market wage w.
Also, the goods supply qfj,r:3(p, d, t) as a function of the time-r:3 goods market price p is determined
as follows. The reservation goods price of ﬁrm j for the time r:3 goods market is given by
pfj,r:3(d, t) = λ · Ej,t[pr:3] (18)
8Without loss of generality, the reservation wage (17) could be expressed in real terms by dividing each side of
(17) by the expected goods price at time r:1, where this price expectation is formed at the current time t.
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where Ej,t[pr:3] denotes the time-r:3 goods market price expected by ﬁrm j, based on its state at
time t. The parameter λ in (18) determines the scale of each ﬁrm's reservation goods price relative
to its expected goods price.
The reservation price (18) has the standard meaning that it is the lowest price that ﬁrm j expects
at time t to be willing to accept for its supplied goods at time r:1. If p < pfj,r:3(d, t), then
qfj,r:3(p, d, t) = 0, meaning that ﬁrm j does not plan to participate in the time-r:3 goods market at
the goods market price p. On the other hand, if p ≥ pfj,r:3(d, t), then
qfj,r:3(p, d, t) = ψ · qstockj,r:2 (19)
That is, ﬁrm j plans to supply a fraction ψ of its time-r:2 goods stock into the time-r:3 goods
market at the goods market price p. The parameter ψ in (19) determines the scale of each ﬁrm's
goods supply relative to its current stock of goods. Note that qstockj,r:2 will be known to ﬁrm j at time
r:2, prior to the opening of the goods market at time r:3.
The decision domain Df depends on the grid speciﬁcations for Lf , Γ, Λ, and Ψ; these grid spec-
iﬁcations are explained in Appendix A. The transformation function TRfj,t depends on the wage
expectation in (17) and the price expectation in (18). The method used by ﬁrms to form and
update their wage and price expectations is explained in Appendix B.
4.4 RL Decision Rule for Consumers and Firms
Reinforcement learning embodies the basic common-sense principle that the propensity to select
relatively good decisions should be reinforced and the propensity to select relatively poor decisions
should be discouraged. Immediate rewards ﬂowing from decisions are typically used to update the
propensities for choosing these decisions in an appropriate up or down direction.
The reinforcement learning (RL) decision rule used for consumers and ﬁrms in the DM Game is
an RL algorithm developed by Nicolaisen et al. (2001). This algorithm is referred to as Modiﬁed
Roth-Erev Reinforcement Learning (MRE-RL) because it introduces modiﬁcations to correct for
two potentially problematic aspects of an RL algorithm originally developed by Roth and Erev
(1995) and Erev and Roth (1998).9 The RL decision rule is reactive in the sense that it asks the
following backward-looking question: Given past events, what decision should I make now?
For the DM Game, the immediate reward Rci (d, t) received by a consumer i as a result of selecting
a decision d in Dc at the start of any period t is taken to be consumer i's realized period-t utility.
Similarly, the immediate reward Rfj (d, t) received by a ﬁrm j as a result of selecting a decision d
in Df at the start of any period t is taken to be ﬁrm j's realized period-t proﬁt.
9As detailed in Nicolaisen et al. (2001), the two problematic aspects of the original Roth-Erev RL algorithm are
solution degeneracy for some parameter conﬁgurations and no updating of relative choice propensities in response
to zero-reward outcomes.
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Below we explain the RL decision rule for an arbitrary decision-maker v who selects a decision d
from a ﬁnite decision domain D in each period t, receiving an immediate reward R(d, t), where v
could represent either a consumer or a ﬁrm in the DM Game. Let the ﬁnite cardinality of D be
denoted by D, and let the elements of D be indexed by d = 1, . . . ,D.
Suppose it is the start of the initial period 0, prior to decision selection, and suppose decision-maker
v must select a decision from its decision domain D for period 0. Suppose the initial propensity
of v to select decision d in D at time 0 is exogenously given by q(d, 0) for d = 1, . . . ,D. Let the
vector of these initial propensities be denoted by q(0) = (q(1, 0), . . . , q(D, 0)).
Now suppose it is the start of any period t ≥ 0, prior to decision selection, and suppose the current
propensity of decision-maker v to select decision d in D is given by q(d, t) for d = 1, . . . ,D. The





, d = 1, . . . ,D (20)
In (20), C is a cooling parameter that aﬀects the degree to which v makes use of propensity values
in determining his choice probabilities. As C → ∞, then Prob(d, t) → 1/D, so that in the limit
v pays no attention to propensity values in forming his choice probabilities. On the other hand,
as C → 0, the choice probabilities (20) become increasingly peaked over the particular decisions d
having the highest propensity values q(d, t), thereby increasing the probability that these decisions
will be chosen by v.
At the end of period t, the current propensity q(d, t) that decision-maker v associates with each
decision d in D is updated in accordance with the following rule. Let dt in D denote the decision
that v actually selected and implemented during period t. Also, let R(dt, t) denote the reward
attained by v at the end of period t as a result of the implementation of dt. Then, for each decision
d in D,




[1− e] ·R(dt, t) if d = dt
e · q(d, t)/[D − 1] if d 6= dt
(22)
Note d 6= dt implies D ≥ 2. The recency parameter ρ ∈ [0, 1] appearing in (21) controls the relative
weighting of past versus current rewards in the updating of the propensities. The experimentation
parameter e ∈ [0, 1) appearing in (22) permits reinforcement to spill over from a chosen decision
to other decisions to encourage experimentation with various decisions in the early stages of the
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learning process.10
In summary, the RL decision rule is fully characterized once values are speciﬁed for the vector of
parameter values (D,q(0), C, e, ρ). Note that the RL decision rule is well-deﬁned for any decision
domain with ﬁnite cardinality D; the exact form of the decisions constituting this decision domain
is irrelevant. Note, also, that the decision-maker does not need to know his reward function;
the RL decision rule only makes use of realized rewards, not potential rewards. The versatility
and low-information requirements of the RL decision rule, together with its demonstrated robust
performance in diverse situations, have led to its widespread use in learning applications.
4.5 FL Decision Rule for Consumers and Firms
The forward-looking (FL) decision rule used for consumers and ﬁrms in the DM Game is a greedy
variant of the Q-learning algorithm developed by Watkins (1989) that permits decisions to be taken
in accordance with dynamic programming policy functions in approximate form. The FL decision
rule is forward looking in the sense that it asks the following anticipatory question: If I make this
decision now, what will happen in the future?
The key conceptual construct underlying Q-learning (and stochastic dynamic programming in
general) for a decision-maker v is the value function Vt(x), deﬁned to be the optimum expected
total reward that can be obtained by v, starting at time t in state x. An important derived
conceptual construct is then the policy function expressing the optimal decision for v as a function
of the time t and state x. Below we provide an intuitive derivation of -greedy Q-learning as a
policy-function approximation method, without consideration of technical details regarding the
existence and uniqueness of optimal solutions.
Suppose a decision-maker v is in state x at some current time t. Suppose v implements a decision
d, observes a random event realization ω, obtains an immediate reward Rt(x, d, ω), and transits
to a new state x′ = St(x, d, ω). Then the best that v can do, starting from time t+ 1, is Vt+1(x′).
Consequently, letting E[·] denote expectation with respect to the random event ω, the best that v
10The use of q(d; t) in the response (22) in place of R(dt, t) is a key modiﬁcation of the original Roth-Erev RL
algorithm that was introduced by Nicolaisen et al. (2001) in order to correct a potentially serious zero reward-zero
updating feature of the original algorithm. With R(dt, t) in place of q(d; t) in (22), if a selected action dt results in
a reward R(dt, t) = 0, then the Response(d, t) in (22) is zero. This implies that the choice propensities q(d, t) in (21)
are uniformly changed by a factor of [1−ρ], hence their relative sizes are unchanged. As reported in Nicolaisen et al.
(2001), this failure to update the relative sizes of the choice propensities in response to zero-reward outcomes can
result in a substantial loss of market eﬃciency in auction markets because participants whose bids and oﬀers fail to
clear do not learn from their mistakes. The use of q(d; t) in (22) ensures that any selected action dt with a positive
propensity that results in a reward R(dt; t) = 0 will have its propensity (hence choice probability) reduced relative
to other actions with positive propensities, thus encouraging the decision-maker to move away from zero-reward
actions towards better actions.
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can do, starting in state x at time t, is
Vt(x) = max
d
E [Rt(x, d, ω) + βVt+1(St(x, d, ω))] (23)
Finally, let d∗(t, x) denote the optimal policy function expressing the optimal decision d in (23) as
a function of the current time t and state x. Then (23) can equivalently be written as
Vt(x) = E [Rt(x, d
∗(t, x), ω) + βVt+1(St(x, d∗(t, x), ω)] (24)
The recursive relationships (23) and (24) provide simple illustrations of Richard Bellman's cele-
brated principle of optimality for stochastic dynamic programming problems. As detailed in Powell
(2011, 2014), one practical diﬃculty is how to compute the value function Vt(x) and the optimal
policy function d∗(t, x). Another practical diﬃculty is that the reward function Rt(x, d, ω) and/or
the state transition function St(x, d, ω) might not be known.
The Q-learning method provides a way to implement decisions in approximate accordance with
optimal policy functions for certain classes of decision problems. Below we provide a simple
exposition of Q-learning that is applicable for the DM Game.
Suppose a decision problem has an inﬁnite planning horizon, random events ω are governed by
a stationary probability distribution, and the reward, state transition, and value functions have
time-invariant forms R(w, d, ω), S(x, d, ω), and V (x). For each state x and decision d, deﬁne
Q(x, d) = E [R(x, d, ω) + βV (S(x, d, ω))] (25)
where the expectation in (25) is taken with respect to the stationary probability distribution
governing ω. If the Q-values in (25) can be learned, then the optimal policy function d∗(x) is
determined as follows: For any state x,
d∗(x) = arg max
d
Q(x, d) (26)
Hence, the learning of the Q-values in (25) avoids the need for separate learning or knowledge of
the reward, state transition, and value functions.
In its simplest form, Q-learning uses the following iterative procedure to determine estimates
Q̂(x, d) for the Q-values Q(x, d) in (25), conditional on a user-speciﬁed recency parameter α and
a user-speciﬁed discount factor β:
Step 1: Initialize Q̂(x, d) to a random value for each possible state x and decision d.
Step 2: Observe an actual state x′.
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Step 3: Pick a decision d′ and implement it.
Step 4: Observe the next state x
′′
and the next reward R
′′
.
Step 5: Update the estimate Q̂(x′, d′) as follows:









Step 6: Loop back to Step 2 and repeat.
The above procedure does not specify how the decision in Step 3 is to be picked. Let  be any
number in (0, 1). The -greedy variant of Q-learning replaces the above Step 3 with an alternative
Step 3′ incorporating a speciﬁc decision selection process that accommodates two goals: (i) Exploit
current information for maximum possible current gain; and (ii) seek new information to improve
opportunities for future gains. This decision selection process is as follows: With probability 
the decision-maker v in Step 3′ experiments by selecting a random decision d′. However, with
probability [1− ] the decision-maker v instead greedily chooses a decision dˆ that maximizes the
current estimator Q̂(x′, d) for Q(x′, d).
In summary, the -greedy Q-learning method for a decision-maker v is fully characterized once
values are speciﬁed for the initial Q-value estimates Q̂(x, d) and the three parameters (α, β, ).
4.6 EO Decision Rules for Consumers and Firms
Each EO agent (consumer or ﬁrm) at the start of each period t ≥ 0 attempts to maximize an
explicit expression for their expected reward (utility or proﬁt) over current and future periods
r ≥ t, subject to constraints. The EO agents use a combined open-loop/closed-loop optimization
approach in the following sense: They undertake their maximization problems in each period t
conditional on updated state information, yet in these maximizations they ignore the fact that
they will re-optimize their decision selections at the start of each future period r > t. They also
ignore that rationing can occur on the margin in the market clearing processes.
Speciﬁcally, at the start of each period t ≥ 0 an EO consumer i selects a decision d in Dc that
maximizes his expected intertemporal utility over current and future periods r ≥ t. In this
maximization, consumer imakes use of the transformation function TRci,t(d) detailed in Section 4.2
to map each possible decision d in Dc at time t into a collection of current and future labor supply
and goods demand functions (lci,r:1(w, d, t), q
c
i,r:3(p, d, t))r≥t.




























qci,r:3(pr:3, d, t), 1− lci,r:1(wr:1, d, t)
)]
(32)







subject to the technological and feasibility constraints (6)-(11) for r ≥ t, where wt:1 and pt:3 are










j,r:3(pr:3, d, t)− wr:1lfj,r:1(wr:1, d, t)
]
(34)
As explained in Appendix B, the expectations in the maximization problems (28) and (33) for
each period t are based on estimated probability distributions for future labor market wages,
future goods market prices, and future dividend payments (for consumers), conditional on the
states of consumer i and ﬁrm j at time t.
As explained in Appendix C, approximate solutions for the maximization problems (28) and (33)
are derived using two diﬀerent decision rules. Brieﬂy summarized, the ﬁrst decision rule, referred
to as the EO Adaptive Dynamic Programming (EO-ADP) decision rule, derives an approximate
solution in each period t by solving a stochastic dynamic programming recurrence relation, assum-
ing a basis-function approximation for the value function. The second decision rule, referred to
as the EO Finite Horizon (EO-FH) decision rule, replaces the inﬁnite planning horizon in each
period t with a ﬁnite planning horizon of length T , called the forecasting horizon, and then derives
an approximate solution by means of direct search across the decision domain.
5 Social Planner Benchmark Model
In order to report comparative performance outcomes for our tested decision-rule combinations,
it is desirable to have a benchmark model with a provably unique optimal solution against which
the performance of each combination can be compared. This section explains our construction of
a social planner model for this purpose.
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As detailed in Section 3, in the DM Game all consumers are structurally identical at the initial
time 0 and all ﬁrms are structurally identical at the initial time 0. Moreover, there are no external
shocks. In consequence, heterogeneity among consumers and among ﬁrms only arises endogenously,
over time, as a result of their market participations.
All sources of uncertainty for the DM Game thus disappear if market decision-making by consumers
and ﬁrms is replaced by a social planner who maximizes the intertemporal utility of a representative
consumer subject only to technological feasibility constraints, conditional on the restriction that
the structurally-identical consumers must all be treated alike and the structurally-identical ﬁrms
must all be treated alike. The resulting model, hereafter referred to as the Social Planner (SP)
Benchmark Model, is introduced here in order to have a benchmark of comparison for the DM-
Game simulation ﬁndings reported in Section 7.
Speciﬁcally, suppose the number I of DM-Game consumers and the number J of DM-Game ﬁrms
are arbitrary positive integers, and let qstock−1 ≥ 0 denote the exogenously given goods stock of each
ﬁrm at the start of period 0. We consider a social planner who solves the following social welfare




βtu(qct:3, 1− lct:1) (35)
with respect to {lct:1, qct:3}∞t=0, subject to the following constraints for each t ≥ 0:




0 ≤ qstockt , qct:3
lct:1 ∈ {0, 1}
To obtain a concrete SP Benchmark Model solution, we assume that the utility function u(·) in
(35) takes the form
u(q, 1− l) = δc0 · ln (b(q) + q) + δc1 · [1− l] (37)
where12
11Given the exponential form of the discount factor in (35), the social planner would exhibit time consistency,
meaning that re-optimization in successive periods would not result in any deviation from the optimal solution
determined at time 0.
12In order to permit consumers to constructively compare consequences for failure to participate in the goods
market, the valuation they place on failure to participate needs to be ﬁnite. As will be seen in Section 7, the
advantage of introducing the discontinuous valuation function b(q) in (38) is that a consumer's utility takes on a




1.0 if q > 0b ∈ (0, 1) if q = 0 (38)
Also, the production function F (·) in (36) is assumed to take the form
F (l) = δf0 l
δf1 (39)
We further assume that the values speciﬁed for the parameters appearing in this SP Benchmark














Table 2: Maintained parameter values for the SP Benchmark Model and the DM Game







3.0 · ln(b(qct:3) + qct:3) + 0.5 · (1− lct:1)
]
(41)






0 ≤ sstockt , qct:3
lct:1 ∈ {0, 1}
sstock−1 = 0 (42)
The optimal solution of the reduced SP Benchmark Model (41) is a full-employment solution with
lct:1 = q
c
t:3 = 1 and s
stock
t = 0 for all t ≥ 0. The proof, by induction, is provided in Appendix D.
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Given this optimal solution, the representative consumer attains the stationary per-period utility
level
u(1, 0) = [3.0 · ln(2)] ≈ 2.08 (43)






[0.95]t3.0 · ln(2) = 3.0 · ln(2) 1
1− 0.95 ≈ 41.59 (44)
Note that the smallest single-period utility outcome that a representative consumer can feasibly
attain under the SP Benchmark Model assumptions is u(0, 0) = 3.0 · ln(0.5) ≈ −2.08.
6 Sensitivity Design
6.1 Design Overview
The main focus of this study is the degree to which consumers in the DM Game are able to attain
optimal utility outcomes when the DM-Game consumers and ﬁrms use diﬀerent combinations of
locally-constructive decision rules. The tested decision-rule combinations for consumers (C) and
ﬁrms (F), identiﬁed by assigned case numbers Nk, are displayed in Table 3.
C:RL C:FL C:EO-FH C:EO-ADP
F:RL N1−N10 N21 N31 N39
F:FL N22 N11−N20 N32 N40
F:EO-FH N33 N34 N23−N30 N41
F:EO-ADP N42 N43 N44 N35−N38
Table 3: Tested combinations of locally-constructive decision rules
For each of the forty-four cases in Table 3, the utility functions, production functions, initial goods
stocks, initial money balances, and initial demand/supply decisions of the consumers and ﬁrms
were set the same for the Social Planner (SP) Benchmark Model developed in Section 5 and for
the DM Game. In particular, the parameter value settings listed in Table 2 for the SP Benchmark
Model were also adopted as ﬁxed parameter settings for the DM Game.
Given these common speciﬁcations, the unique optimal solution for the SP Benchmark Model is
also the unique optimal solution for consumers in the DM Game.13 Any DM Game-departures
from optimality can be attributed solely to the fact that DM-Game outcomes are determined by
13Recall from Section 5 that the optimal solution for the SP Benchmark Model is expressed in stationary per-
capita form for arbitrary positive numbers of consumers and ﬁrms. Consequently, it remains the optimal solution
for the DM Game even if some ﬁrms become bankrupt and are forced to exit the DM-Game economy.
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the locally-constructive decisions of imperfectly informed consumers and ﬁrms over time rather
than by the intertemporal decisions of a perfectly-informed social planner at the initial time 0.
For each decision-rule case in Table 3, certain key decision-rule parameters were selected as
treatment factors while all other parameters were maintained at ﬁxed values. Combinations of
treatment-factor values were then selected for testing. For each combination of interest, the num-
ber of runs was set at NRuns=10 (corresponding to 10 seed values for pseudo-random number
generation) to control for stochastic eﬀects.14 The length of each run was set to LRun= 1000
periods. To reduce dependence on transient eﬀects, outcomes from the ﬁrst LOmit=50 periods in
each run were omitted from all calculated performance metrics.
6.2 Performance Metrics
DM-Game ﬁrms are corporate entities for the facilitation of production. Hence, for the most part,
our performance metrics focus on utility outcomes for the DM-Game consumers.
Since diﬀerent cases involve diﬀerent planning-horizon lengths, the main ex post performance
metric used for each case Nk in Table 3 is average realized single-period utility u¯k, bounded above
and below by two standard deviations σu¯k . Other ex post performance metrics used to report results
include the average realized single-period utility for period t, denoted by u¯kt , the average realized
cumulative utility through period t, denoted by u¯cumul,kt , the average realized real market-clearing
wage, denoted by w¯real,k, the average realized real market-clearing wage for period t, denoted by
w¯real,kt , and average realized single-period proﬁts, denoted by p¯i
k.
The precise calculation for each of these performance metrics is given in Appendix E.
6.3 Structural Parameter Values Maintained for All Cases
As detailed in Section 3.4, the constraints and goals of the I consumers in the DM Game depend
commonly on the speciﬁc settings for (M c−1, u(·), β) at the initial time 0. Also, as detailed in
Section 3.5, the constraints and goals of the J ﬁrms in the DM Game depend commonly on
the speciﬁc settings for (M f−1, q
stock
−1 , F (·), µ, κdiv) at the initial time 0. All of these functions and
parameters have ﬁxed speciﬁcations for all cases reported in this study. The utility and production
function speciﬁcations u(·) and F (·), plus the values of β and qstock−1 , are set the same as in Section 5
for the SP Benchmark Model, and the values for the remaining parameters are set as in Table 4.









Table 4: Maintained parameter values for the constraints and goals of consumers and ﬁrms
The transformation function TRcit for consumer i in period t postulates that consumer i calculates
at time t a reservation wage (14) for each current and future period r ≥ t, which in turn depends
on consumer i's expectation for the wage in periods r ≥ t. Similarly, the transformation function
TRfj,t for ﬁrm j in period t postulates that ﬁrm j at time t calculates a reservation wage (17) and
a reservation goods price (18) for each current and future period r ≥ t, which in turn depend on
ﬁrm j's expectations for the wage and goods price in periods r ≥ t.
As detailed in Appendix B, the methods used by the consumers and ﬁrms to form and update these
wage and goods price expectations in each period t depend on these agents' prior beliefs regarding
wages and goods prices, and also on their memory length, i.e., the number of past periods they take
into account when forming these expectations. The prior-belief parameters are set at maintained
values, given in Table 16. However, as will be clariﬁed below in Section 6.5, two diﬀerent settings
are tested for the memory length.
6.4 Parameter Values Maintained for Each Decision Rule
The decision domain Dc in (13) for each consumer i depends on the grid speciﬁcations for Ω and
Θ. Also, the decision domain Df in (16) for each ﬁrm j depends on the grid speciﬁcations for
Lf , Γ, Λ, and Ψ. As detailed in Tables 12 through 15 in Appendix A, two diﬀerent forms are
considered for these grid speciﬁcations: namely, a small form and a big form.
The RL decision rule described in Section 4.4, based on the MRE-RL algorithm developed in
Nicolaisen et al. (2001), is characterized by the vector of parameter values (D,q(0), C, e, ρ). The
recency parameter ρ plays a key role in the determination of performance in many previous RL
applications, e.g., the work of Roth and Erev cited in Section 4.4. Consequently, we focus attention
on ρ as a treatment factor for the RL decision rule.
The maintained values for the remaining RL parameters are set as follows. The parameter D is the
cardinality of the decision domain Dc for an RL consumer or Df for an RL ﬁrm. This cardinality
is determined by the grid-type speciﬁcation for Dc or Df , which is always set to small for an RL
consumer or RL ﬁrm. The vector q(0) of initial propensities has dimension D. This vector is set
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equal to a ﬁxed vector qc,∗ for an RL consumer and to a ﬁxed vector qf,∗ for an RL ﬁrm, where
these ﬁxed vectors are deﬁned as follows. For an RL consumer, the initial propensity assigned by
qc,∗ to a decision dc = (lc, ω, θ) ∈ Dc is 1.1 if lc = 1 and 1.0 otherwise. For an RL ﬁrm, the initial
propensity assigned by qf,∗ to a decision df = (lf , γ, λ, ψ) ∈ Df is 1.1 if lf = lfL and 1.0 otherwise.
The cooling parameter C is set to 1.0. Finally, based on the results reported in Nicolaisen et al.
(2001) and subsequent MRE-RL studies, the experimentation parameter e is set to 0.95. These






Table 5: Maintained parameter values for RL decision rules
The FL decision rule described in Section 4.5, a greedy variant of Q-learning, is characterized by
the vector Q0 of initial Q-value estimates Q̂(x, d) and the parameter vector (α, β, ). To facilitate
comparisons with the RL decision rule, we select the recency parameter α to be a treatment factor
for the FL decision rule.
The state-space for each FL agent is discretized in order to keep computational solution-times
manageable. The state xi,t of an FL consumer i at each time t ≥ 0 is given by his time-t money
balance M ci,t−1, discretized into the following three bins: [0.0, 5.0),[5.0, 10.0), [10.0,∞). The state
xj,t of an FL-ﬁrm j at each time t ≥ 0 consists of its time-t money balance M ft−1 and its time-t
goods stock qstockt , each also discretized into three bins, as follows: for the money balance, [0.0, 50.0),
[50.0, 100.0), [100.0,∞); and for the goods stock, [0.0, 5.0),[5.0, 10.0), [10.0,∞).
The maintained parameter values for the FL decision rule are then set as follows. The vector Q0
is set equal to a ﬁxed vector Qc,∗ for an FL consumer and to a ﬁxed vector Qf,∗ for an FL ﬁrm.
For an FL consumer, the initial Q-value estimate assigned by Qc,∗ to a state-decision pair (x, dc),
where dc = (lc, ω, θ) ∈ Dc, is 0.5 if lc = 1 and 0.0 otherwise. For an FL ﬁrm, the initial Q-value
estimate assigned by Qf,∗ to a state-decision pair (x, df ), where df = (lf , γ, λ, ψ) ∈ Df , is 0.5 if
lf = lfL and 0.0 otherwise. Finally, the Q-learning discount parameter β is set to 0.95 and the







Table 6: Maintained parameter values for FL decision rules
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Maintained parameter values for the EO-ADP and EO-FH decision rules are provided in Appendix
C, together with detailed discussions of their formulations and implementations.
6.5 Tested Speciﬁcations for Case Treatment Factors
As detailed in Appendix A, two diﬀerent settings are tested for the decision-domain grid speciﬁ-
cations: namely, a small setting and a big setting. Although a small grid-type is maintained for
both the RL and FL decision rules, both small and big grid-types are tested for EO agents.
As detailed in Appendix B, two diﬀerent settings are tested for the memory parameter wm used by
consumers and ﬁrms to adaptively update their expectations. The ﬁrst setting, wm=1, indicates
that consumers and ﬁrms in each period t > 0 only make use of realizations from the previous
period t − 1 to form their expectations for periods r ≥ t. The second setting, wm=all, indicates
that consumers and ﬁrms in each period t > 0 make use of realizations from all previous periods
{0, . . . , t− 1} to form their expectations for periods r ≥ t.
Note that all tested cases depend on the setting for wm. This dependence arises because, as
detailed in Sections 4.2 and 4.3, the transformation functions TRci,t and TR
c
j,t mapping consumer
and ﬁrm period-t decisions into collections of demand and supply functions for periods r ≥ t
depend on the wage, price, and dividend payment expectations of the consumers and ﬁrms, which
in turn depend on wm.
For the cases listed along the diagonal in Table 3, the tested combinations of values for the
treatment-factor parameters are as shown in Tables 7 through 10. All cross-products of the listed
parameter values are tested.
Parameter Range of Values
ρ {0.05, 0.10, 0.5, 0.90, 0.95}
wm 1, all
Table 7: Treatment-factor values for the RL decision rules in Cases N1-N10
Parameter Range of values
α {0.05, 0.10, 0.50, 0.90, 0.95}
wm 1, all
Table 8: Treatment-factor values for the FL decision rules in Cases N11-N20




Table 9: Treatment-factor values for the EO-FH decision rules in Cases N23-N30
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Parameter Range of values
wm 1, all
grid-type small, big
Table 10: Treatment-factor values for the EO-ADP decision rules in Cases N35-N38
For the remaining cases in Table 3, the treatment-factor values are as shown in Table 11. Super-











Table 11: Treatment-factor values for Cases N21, N22, N31-N34, and N39-N44
7 Key Findings for the DM Game
7.1 Findings Overview
This section reports key ﬁndings for the forty-four DM-Game cases N1-N44 listed in Table 3.
Each case corresponds to a distinct setting of the treatment-factor values for this case's indicated
decision-rule combination.
An important point to keep in mind in interpreting these ﬁndings is that bankrupt ﬁrms must exit
the DM-Game economy, and there is no mechanism for ﬁrm entry. Consequently, the number of
ﬁrms in each simulation run either stays the same or declines. It is therefore a very challenging
problem for the DM-Game economy to sustain good performance over long periods of time.
In particular, since consumer and ﬁrm agents in the DM Game have no a priori information
regarding the form of the optimal SP Benchmark Model solution, they do not know that their
initially-set conditions are in fact optimal conditions. Consequently, departures from optimality
immediately begin to arise as the consumer and ﬁrm agents start exploring their decision domains
in search of better utility and proﬁt outcomes. These exploratory eﬀorts result in a highly non-
stationary environment that makes learning diﬃcult.
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As will be seen below, given some decision-rule combinations, the DM Game consumer and ﬁrm
agents are able to learn their way back towards the optimal solution for the SP Benchmark Model
with full employment. This tends to occur more frequently when the agents have long memories
(wm=all), because long memories permit the agents to recall their initial utility and proﬁt out-
comes when in fact their selected decisions were close to optimal. In such cases, good average
performance results.
Given other decision-rule combinations, however, the agents' early exploratory activities result in
mistakes that propagate throughout the DM-Game economy, causing a downward spiraling of
performance from which the economy does not recover. For example, some consumers and ﬁrms
might make decisions that, given current market conditions, result in disastrous consequences for
them. Firms might become bankrupt, consumers might lose money, ﬁrms might be unable to
secure workers, and consumers might be unable to ﬁnd work. These bad outcomes then result
in further bad outcomes. The majority of cases for which performance is poor exhibit growing
unemployment and increasing divergence from the optimal SP Benchmark Model solution.
Overall, cases in which each consumer and ﬁrm agent uses a rolling ﬁxed-horizon EO-FH decision
rule tend to achieve better performance than cases in which these agents use RL, FL, and/or EO-
ADP decision rules. Unlike the RL decision rule, the EO-FH and EO-ADP decision rules entail
adaptive foresight. Unlike the RL and FL decision rules, the EO-FH and EO-ADP decision rules
exploit the structural form of the intertemporal optimization problems for consumers and ﬁrms.
However, unlike the EO-ADP decision rule, the EO-FH decision rule relies on only one structural
approximation: a truncation of the planning horizon. In contrast, the EO-ADP decision rule relies
on the basis-function approximation of dynamic programming value functions.
Nevertheless, comparative performance is also seen to depend strongly on the speciﬁc settings for
the treatment-factor parameters. For example, all else equal, a long memory covering all previous
periods (wm=all) tends to result in better performance than a short memory covering only the
latest period (wm=1).
Sections 7.2 through 7.5 report ﬁndings obtained for the diagonal cases in Table 3, for which the
DM consumers and ﬁrms all use the same type of decision rule. Section 7.6 reports ﬁndings for
the oﬀ-diagonal cases in which mixed combinations of decision rules are used.
7.2 Findings for the Pure RL Cases N1-N10
Consider cases N1-N10 in Table 3, for which all DM-Game consumers and ﬁrms use an RL decision
rule entailing reactive reinforcement learning. Each of these cases corresponds to a distinct setting
of the RL treatment factors (ρ, wm) in Table 7, taking as given the maintained parameter values
in Table 5.
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As seen in Section 4.4, the RL recency parameter ρ ∈ [0, 1] determines the weight [1 − ρ] that is
placed on accumulated past single-period utility outcomes relative to the weight [1− e] placed on
the most recent single-period utility outcome. Since e is set at the maintained value e = 0.95, a
reduction in ρ implies an increase in the weight placed on past utility outcomes relative to the
weight placed on the most recent utility outcome.
Figure 4 reports performance outcomes for cases N1-N10 in Table 3. The performance of each
case Nk is measured by average realized single-period utility u¯k, and cases are reported from left
to right in ascending performance order.
Figure 4: Pure RL Cases N1-N10: Average realized single-period utility u¯k with bounds of ± two
standard deviations σu¯k
Given the longer memory length wm=all, it is seen that smaller RL recency parameter values ρ
(i.e., larger weights on past utility outcomes) tend to result in better performance than larger ρ
values. Given a one-period memory length wm=1, however, a relatively low performance level
results for all ρ values. Moreover, even in the best-performing cases, performance is signiﬁcantly
below 2.08, the optimal stationary per-period utility level (43) obtained by the representative
consumer in the SP Benchmark Model
7.3 Findings for the Pure FL Cases N11-N20
Consider cases N11-N20 in Table 3, for which all DM-Game consumers and ﬁrms use an FL decision
rule based on Q-learning. Each of these cases corresponds to a distinct setting of the FL treatment
factors (α,wm) in Table 8, taking as given the maintained parameter values in Table 6.
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As seen in Section 4.5, the FL recency parameter α ∈ [0, 1] determines the weight [1 − α] that is
placed on past Q-value estimates relative to the weight α placed on current and anticipated future
utility outcomes. Since these two weights sum to 1.0, a reduction in α implies an increase in the
weight placed on past utility outcomes relative to current and anticipated future utility outcomes.
Figure 5 reports performance outcomes for cases N11-N20 in Table 3. The performance of each
case Nk is measured by average realized single-period utility u¯k, and cases are reported from left
to right in ascending performance order.
Figure 5: Pure FL Cases N11-N20: Average realized single-period utility u¯k with bounds of ± two
standard deviations σu¯k
The best pure FL performance is achieved for the case in which the memory length wm is long
(wm=all) and the FL-recency parameter α is set at 0.90. Surprisingly, however, this best perfor-
mance is also nearly achieved for wm=all with α = 0.05 or α = 0.10. However, for each tested α
setting, performance improves as wm is increased from wm=1 to wm=all.
The implication we draw from these ﬁndings is that our performance metrics are not very sensitive
to the setting of the FL recency parameter α in the pure FL experiments conducted to date.
7.4 Findings for the Pure EO-FH Cases N23-N30
Consider cases N23-N30 in Table 3, for which all DM-Game consumers and ﬁrms use an EO-FH
decision rule entailing explicit intertemporal optimization by means of a rolling ﬁxed horizon.
Each of these cases corresponds to a distinct setting of the EO-FH treatment factors T , wm, and
grid-type in Table 9, taking as given the maintained parameter value NDrawsFH=10 discussed in
Appendix C.2.
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The length T of the forecasting horizon controls the extent to which an EO-FH agent is forward
looking. This anticipation could be beneﬁcial if the agent's anticipations are an accurate reﬂection
of future uncertainties, but harmful if not. Restricting the number of potential decision selections
by specifying grid-type=small rather than grid-type=big increases the sampling density, i.e., the
frequency with which each potential decision is tried. On the other hand, grid-type=small results
in a cruder approximation of the decision domain, which could prevent an EO-FH agent from
determining a truly best decision.
Figure 6 reports performance outcomes for cases N23-N30 in Table 3. The performance of each
case Nk is measured by average realized single-period utility u¯k, and cases are reported from left
to right in ascending performance order.
Figure 6: Pure EO-FH Cases N23-N30: Average realized single-period utility u¯k with bounds of ±
two standard deviations σu¯k
Given a one-period memory length wm=1, performance is relatively low regardless of the grid-type
or the length T of the forecasting horizon. However, given a longer memory length wm=all, it is
seen that having a small grid-type results in better performance than a large grid-type.
Moreover, for wm=all and grid-type=small, the longer forecasting horizon T=20 yields slightly
better performance than the short forecasting horizon T=5. Indeed, as indicated by the standard
deviation bounds in Fig. 6, for this combination of treatment factors the average realized single-
period utility level u¯kt attained in some periods t comes close to matching the optimal stationary
single-period utility level 2.08 achieved by the representative consumer in the SP Benchmark
Model. This occurs despite the rather simplistic Monte Carlo method used by EO-FH agents to
handle their uncertainty regarding future wages, prices and dividends.
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Given the relatively good performance of the EO-FH decision rule under some treatments, it is
interesting to delve deeper into the underlying dynamics. Time-series for utility and real wage
outcomes are depicted below for two illustrative cases: (i) a good case N26 with T=20, wm=all,
and grid-style=small ; and (ii) a bad case N29 with T = 20, wm=1, and grid-style=big.
For the good case N26, depicted in Fig. 7, the average realized single-period utility u¯26t eventually
stabilizes at a level of about 0.5. For the bad case N29, depicted in Fig. 8, the average realized
single-period utility u¯29t quickly stabilizes at a much lower level of about -1.0.
Figure 7: Pure EO-FH Case N26: Average realized single-period utility u¯26t for period t and average
realized cumulative utility u¯cumul,26t through period t, over successive periods t
Figure 8: Pure EO-FH Case N29: Average realized single-period utility u¯29t for period t and average
realized cumulative utility u¯cumul,29t through period t, over successive periods t
The behavior of average real market-clearing wages reﬂects overall macroeconomic performance.
For the good case N26, it is seen in Fig. 9 that w¯real,26t appears to be stabilizing at a level of
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about 0.30. In contrast, for the bad case N29, it is seen in Fig. 10 that w¯real,29t rapidly drops
towards zero.
Figure 9: Pure EO-FH Case N26: Average realized real market-clearing wage w¯real,26t for period t,
over successive periods t
Figure 10: Pure EO-FH Case N29: Average realized real market-clearing wage w¯real,29t for period
t, over successive periods t
7.5 Findings for the Pure EO-ADP Cases N35-N38
Consider cases N35-N38 in Table 3, for which all DM-Game consumers and ﬁrms use an EO-ADP
decision rule entailing explicit optimization via the approximation of dynamic programming value
functions. Each of these cases corresponds to a distinct setting of the EO-ADP treatment factors
wm and grid-type in Table 10, taking as given the maintained parameter values listed in Table 17.
38
Figure 11: Pure EO-ADP Cases N35-N38: Average realized single-period utility u¯k with bounds
of ± two standard deviations σu¯k
Figure 11 reports performance outcomes for these pure EO-ADP cases. The performance of each
case Nk is measured by average realized single-period utility u¯k, and cases are reported from left
to right in ascending performance order.
EO-ADP performance is clearly better with a longer memory length (wm=all) than with a one-
period memory length (wm=1). Moreover, given a longer memory, performance is slightly better
with grid-style=big in comparison with grid-style=small. Overall, however, a low performance
level is attained for all tested settings of the EO-ADP treatment factors in comparison with the
overall performance attained using the RL, FL, and EO-FH decision rules.
7.6 Findings for Mixed Combinations of Decision Rules
From a social welfare point of view, it is only consumer utility outcomes that matter in the DM
Game. However, the players in the DM Game are utility-seeking consumers and proﬁt-seeking
ﬁrms, where the latter act on behalf of their shareholders (who receive their proﬁts as dividend
payments) but not consciously on behalf of consumer welfare per se. Consequently, it is of interest
to construct consumer and ﬁrm payoﬀ matrices for the DM Game, interpreting the decision rules
RL, FL, EO-FH, and EO-ADP as possible pure strategy choices for these players.
We therefore tested the oﬀ-diagonal cases in Table 3 representing mixed combinations of decision
rules. We then used the performance outcomes obtained for these oﬀ-diagonal cases together with
the performance outcomes obtained for the diagonal cases to construct DM-Game payoﬀ matrices,
one for consumers and one for ﬁrms, under the restriction that all consumers use the same decision
rule and all ﬁrms use the same decision rule.
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The consumer payoﬀ matrix, depicted in Fig. 12, reports the average realized single-period utility
u¯k attained by consumers for each indicated case Nk, with darker shades of color corresponding
to higher values of u¯k. The ﬁrm payoﬀ matrix, depicted in Fig. 13, reports the average realized
single-period proﬁts p¯ik attained by ﬁrms for each indicated case Nk, with darker shades of color
corresponding to higher values of p¯ik.
It is important to note the following non-standard aspect of these payoﬀ matrices. For each
pairing of consumer and ﬁrm decision rules along the diagonals, the treatment-factor parameters
are selected in an attempt to permit each agent type to do as well as possible in this pairing.
This is reﬂected in the fact that, in contrast to Table 3, only single cases are considered along the
diagonals.
As seen from the ﬁrm payoﬀ matrix in Fig. 13, EO-FH is a dominant strategy for ﬁrms, given
the particular case selections and treatment-factor speciﬁcations used to form this payoﬀ matrix.
Interestingly, as seen from the consumer payoﬀ matrix in Fig. 12, this is not true for consumers.
For example, the best response of consumers to a ﬁrm choice of FL is to choose FL, not EO-FH.
Nevertheless, it is also seen from these two payoﬀ matrices that (F:EO-FH, C:EO-FH) is a Pareto
optimal Nash equilibrium
Figure 12: Consumer payoﬀ matrix for the DM Game reporting average realized single-period
utility u¯k for the indicated cases Nk. A darker shade of color indicates a higher value for u¯k.
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Figure 13: Firm payoﬀ matrix for the DM Game reporting average realized single-period proﬁts
p¯ik for the indicated cases Nk. A darker shade of color indicates a higher value for p¯ik.
8 Conclusion
In studies involving a single learning agent operating in a stochastic environment, the form of
learning that is best for this agent will depend strongly on whether the stochastic properties of the
environment are stationary or non-stationary. Long memories are typically found to be desirable
in stationary environments but not necessarily in non-stationary environments.
However, in multi-agent learning situations such as the DM Game, additional considerations com-
plicate the determination of optimal learning rules. Even if the physical and institutional environ-
ment is stationary in terms of its stochastic properties, the presence of other learning agents can
induce non-stationarity in the learning environment.
More precisely, if multiple learning agents in a stationary physical and institutional environment
are relatively more responsive to the recent actions of other learning agents, in the sense that they
put relatively higher weight on more recent observations, this can induce persistent suboptimal
ﬂuctuations and cycling as agents continually try to adapt to each other's recent actions. Con-
versely, longer memories with a more even weighting of recent and past observations will tend to
induce inertia in the system, which can result in the system settling down to a particular outcome;
but this outcome is not guaranteed to be optimal.
Although our DM-Game study has a stationary institutional environment, the learning environ-
ment is non-stationary. First, the physical and ﬁnancial environment is time-varying due to pro-
duction and the accumulation of goods stocks and money balances. Second, all of our tested
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decision rules are adaptive rules in the sense that they are conditioned on the current state of the
world. More precisely, the multiple learning agents use these adaptive rules to make successively
determined decisions conditional on time-varying information, beliefs, and physical states. In such
a world, it is not clear a priori whether it would be better for agents to have long memories
that take into account a long history of past observations or shorter memories that only take into
account more recent observations.
A key ﬁnding of our DM-Game study is, indeed, the importance of memory length in determining
DM-Game performance. Simpler decision rules such as RL, FL, and EO-FH can outperform more
sophisticated decision rules such as EO-ADP, but only if coupled with a relatively long memory
length. The beneﬁt of a long memory arises because we initialize the DM Game to optimal SP
Benchmark Model settings. It is then beneﬁcial for consumers and ﬁrms to be able to recall the
utility and proﬁt outcomes they attained during initial periods because their decisions were in fact
close to optimal during these initial periods.
However, additional studies are surely needed to better understand the implications of locally-
constructive decision making in macroeconomic contexts such as the DM Game. To date we have
only explored a small number of initial conditions and parameter settings. In particular, there is
no guarantee that the parameter values we have set for our decision rules are well-tailored for the
DM-Game environment in which these decision rules are being used. For example, the cooling
parameter C appearing in equation (20) for the RL decision rule plays an important role in many
well-known learning methods and solution algorithms, such as simulated annealing; yet the current
study treats C as a maintained parameter value ﬁxed at C=1.
Moreover, our current DM-Game study imposes various structural restrictions that would be inter-
esting to relax. For example, the labor oﬀers of the DM consumers are restricted to be in 0-1 binary
form in order to simplify the analysis and reporting of comparative learning outcomes. It would be
of interest to explore more general labor market formulations in future studies of macroeconomic
systems with constructively rational agents.
It would also be of great interest to consider the eﬀects on macroeconomic performance when
consumers have positive subsistence consumption needs and have to trade for consumption goods
in order to survive. This would put stronger pressure on consumers to participate in both labor
and goods markets, which in turn would aﬀect their reservation wages and prices. In particular,
it would be intriguing to investigate what the best-performing decision rules for consumers and
ﬁrms would be in response to a systematic increase in the subsistence consumption need level.
Would conservative decision-making based on reactive reinforcement learning eventually dominate
forward-looking decision-making, such as the EO-FH decision rule that performs best in our current
DM Game with zero subsistence consumption needs?
Moreover, in our current DM-Game modeling, remaining ﬁrms do not immediately modify their
behavior to take into account their larger market shares when some ﬁrms are forced to exit due to
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bankruptcy. Permitting ﬁrms to understand the strategic implications of having other ﬁrms exiting
due to bankruptcy would be an interesting extension to consider in future work. For example, it
could lead to temporary deep price-cutting by ﬁrms that have relatively deep pockets (i.e., that
are able to withstand temporary dips in proﬁts) in an attempt to drive other ﬁrms out of business.
However, to achieve a more compelling modeling of this type of strategic ﬁrm behavior, it would
presumably also be necessary to consider the contestability of markets and to permit possible ﬁrm
(re)-entry if price-cutting ﬁrms subsequently attempt to exploit market power opportunities by
raising prices higher than competitive levels.
Clearly, then, much further study is needed to understand the ramiﬁcations of modeling macroe-
conomies as constructively-rational games, in the sense that agent decision-making is based solely
on own interaction networks, beliefs, information, and physical states without external support
from modeler-imposed coordination and optimality conditions. In particular, a large unexplored
gap exists between constructive rationality and constructive optimality, i.e., the assurance that
the combination of locally-constructive decision processes in use by agents satisﬁes some stated
optimality property, such as Pareto optimality.
Nevertheless, the primary goal of this study has been accomplished. It has been demonstrated that
decision-makers in computational macroeconomic models can implement locally-constructive deci-
sion processes ranging all the way from reactive reinforcement learning to adaptive intertemporal
optimization within the context of a purely historical sequence of events, without the imposition
of external coordination and optimality restrictions.
Another important goal has been the development of the DM Game as a computational laboratory.
Coded in C++, the DM Game is a modular, extensible, and scalable macroeconomic framework
that permits the comparative analysis of diﬀerent physical and institutional environments pop-
ulated by a mix of decision-making agents with diverse decision processes. In future work the
current structure of the DM Game will be extended to include additional critical features, such as
a central government, a central bank, and a commercial banking system.
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Appendix
A Tested Grid Speciﬁcations for Decision Domains
Decision Set of
Component Possible Values
lc Lc = {0, 1}
ω Ω = {0.8, 1.0, 1.2}
θ Θ = {0.0, 0.5, 1.0}
Table 12: Small-grid discretization of the consumer decision domain Dc
Decision Set of
Component Possible Values
lf Lf = {0, 2.5, 5.0, 7.5, 10}
γ Γ = {0.8, 1.0, 1.2}
λ Λ = {0.8, 1.0, 1.2}
ψ Ψ = {0.0, 0.5, 1.0}
Table 13: Small-grid discretization of the ﬁrm decision domain Df .
Decision Set of
Component Possible Values
lc Lc = {0, 1}
ω Ω = {0.10, 0.55, 1.00, 1.45, 1.90}
θ Θ = {0.0, 0.5, 1.0}
Table 14: Big-grid discretization of the consumer decision domain Dc
Decision Set of
Component Possible Values
lf Lf = {0, 2.5, 5.0, 7.5, 10}
γ Γ = {0.10, 0.55, 1.00, 1.45, 1.90}
λ Λ = {0.10, 0.55, 1.00, 1.45, 1.90}
ψ Ψ = {0.0, 0.5, 1.0}
Table 15: Big-grid discretization of the ﬁrm decision domain Df
B Wage, Price, and Dividend Expectation Updating
Consumers and ﬁrms in the DM Game are assumed to follow the same methods in forming and
updating their expectations regarding the distributions governing future market-clearing wages,
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market-clearing goods prices, and dividend payments (for consumers). These methods are char-
acterized by prior-belief parameters and a memory length parameter. The prior-belief parameters
are maintained parameters set at ﬁxed values for all test cases reported in this study. The mem-
ory length parameter is a treatment factor set to reﬂect either a ﬁxed one-period memory or an
expanding memory that takes into account all previous observations at each time t.
Let v denote any consumer or (non-bankrupt) ﬁrm agent in the DM Game. At each time t ≥ 0,
agent v forms normal probability distributions for the market-clearing wage w, the market-clearing
goods price p, and the dividend payment div in current and future periods. These distributions
are characterized by state-conditioned estimates for their means and variances, as follows:
w ∼ N (w¯v,t−1, σ2 Lv,t−1) (45)
p ∼ N (p¯v,t−1, σ2 Gv,t−1) (46)
div ∼ N (d¯v,t−1, σ2 Dv,t−1) (47)
After the determination of a market-clearing wage wt:1 in the forward labor market at time t:1, a
market-clearing price pt:3 in the goods market at time t:3, and a dividend payment divt:5 at time
t:5, agent v updates the means and variances for these distributions in order to obtain updated
estimates for these distributions for use in period t+ 1.15
The method used to obtain updated mean and variance estimates for the wage distribution (45)
is characterized by the following three parameters: a prior wage wv,0; a prior weight n
L
v,0, and a
memory length wm. If wm = all, then agent v calculates these estimates as follows:
w¯v,t =
∑t
r = 0 wr:1 + n
L
v,0 · wv,0




r = 0 (wr:1 − w¯v,t)2 + nLv,o · (wv,0 − w¯v,t)2
t + 1 + nLv,0
(49)
In other words, the mean of the distribution for the expected market-clearing wage is determined
by averaging all market-clearing wages observed to date, together with the prior wage, while the
dispersion of the expected market-clearing wage is determined by averaging the squares of the
deviations of the observed market-clearing wages and the prior wage from the currently estimated
mean market-clearing wage.
If wm = 1, then agent v sets the expected market-clearing wage equal to the most recently observed
15In this updating procedure it is assumed for simplicity that consumers and ﬁrms ignore the fact that the actual
wages determined at the contract settlement time t:4 could diﬀer from the market-clearing wage wt:1 determined
at time t:1 if some ﬁrms become bankrupt at time t:3 due to poor performance in the time-t:3 goods market.
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market-clearing wage:
w¯v,t = wt:1 (50)
Also, agent v sets the expected variance equal to 1% of this expected market-clearing wage:
σ2,Lv,t = 0.01 · w¯v,t (51)
Similar equations are used to obtain updated estimates p¯v,t, σ
2,G
v,t , divv,t, and σ
2,D
v,t for the means
and variances for the goods price distribution (46) and the dividend distribution (47) for wm =






The estimated means w¯v,t and p¯v,t for the market-clearing wage and goods price are used to
determine the reservation wage and reservation price for agent v's transformation function mapping
described in Sections 4.2 and 4.3. Speciﬁcally, Ev,t[wr:1] = w¯v,t−1 and Ev,t[pr:3] = p¯v,t−1 for all
r ≥ t. Thus equations (14), (17), and (18) take the form
wci,r:1(d, t) = ω · w¯i,t−1 (52)
wfj,r:1(d, t) = γ · w¯j,t−1 (53)
pfj,r:3(d, t) = λ · p¯j,t−1 (54)
As clariﬁed below in Section C, the EO-FH and EO-ADP agents make use of the full probability
distributions (45) through (47) in their decision rules. The updating of these distributions requires
speciﬁcations for prior variance values as well as prior mean values.











Table 16: Maintained values for prior-belief parameters
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C Implementation of EO Decision Rules
Various computational approximation methods could be used to implement the EO-FH and EO-
ADP decision rules. The methods used in this study are outlined below. Detailed explanations of
these methods can be found in Powell (2011).
C.1 Implementation of the EO-ADP Decision Rule
Consumers in the DM Game have the same general form of budget and feasibility constraints
(1)-(4) for periods r ≥ 0, the same general form of intertemporal utility objective function (5) for
periods t ≥ 0, and the same single-period utility function u(·) given by (37). The state xi,t of any
consumer i at any time t ≥ 0 is given by:
xi,t =
[









The dimension of the state (55) is ﬁxed at eight, independently of i and t. The normality assump-
tions imposed on the wage, price, and dividend distributions (45) through (47) imply that each
of these distributions is fully characterized in each period t by its estimated mean and variance
appearing in (55).
The value function for consumer i at time t in state xi,t takes the form:









qci,r:3(pr:3, d, t), 1− lci,r:1(wr:1, d, t)
)]
(56)
The right-side maximization in (56) is constrained by the budget and feasibility constraints (1)-(4)
for periods r ≥ t, conditional on xi,t, and implicitly depends on the TRci,t function that maps each
potential period-t decision d ∈ Dc into a sequence of labor supply and goods demand functions
for periods r ≥ t. The expectation in (56) is taken with respect to the wage, price, and dividend
probability distributions (45) through (47), conditional on xi,t.
The structure of the state transition function Sc mapping each possible state xi,t, decision d ∈
Dc, and realization (wt:1, pt:3, wi,t:4, divt:5) into an updated state xi,t+1 for period t + 1 is time
invariant and the same for all consumers i. Also, the left-side summation in (56) is time separable.
Consequently, the value function V c(xi,t) can equivalently be expressed in recursive form, as follows:




qci,t:3(pt:3, d, t), 1− lci,t:1(wt:1, d, t)
)
+ βV c (Sc (xi,t, d, wt:1, pt:3, wi,t:4, divt:5))] (57)
We assume that each EO-ADP consumer i at each time t derives an estimate for the value function
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(56) that solves the recursive relationship (57) by means of a type of adaptive dynamic programming
(ADP) algorithm surveyed in (Powell, 2011, p. 407). The latter algorithm, designed for inﬁnite-
horizon dynamic programming problems, is an approximate policy iteration method implemented
by means of least-squares temporal diﬀerencing. During this value function estimation at time
t, the mean and variance estimates w¯i,t−1, σ2 Li,t−1, p¯i,t−1, σ
2 G
i,t−1, d¯i,t−1, and σ
2 div
i,t−1 in consumer i's
state xi,t are held ﬁxed. No new information is obtained by consumer i during his value function
estimation, so he does not update his state information during this estimation.
A critical step in the EO-ADP algorithm at each time t is the selection of basis functions for
approximating the general form of the value function prior to conducting the value function esti-





θpikφk (xi,t) = θ
pi ·M ci,t−1 (58)
where M ci,t−1 denotes the time-t money balance of consumer i. The value function estimation
problem at time t thus reduces to the estimation of the scalar parameter θpi over some speciﬁed
domain, which in this study is taken to be the interval [0.01, 1000].
It is assumed that EO-ADP ﬁrms use a similar EO-ADP decision rule to estimate their time-t
value functions. The state xi,t of a non-bankrupt EO-ADP ﬁrm j at time t is given by
xj,t =
(







and its value function is given by









j,r:3(pr:3, d, t)− wr:1lfj,r:1(wr:1, d, t)
]
(60)
The right-side maximization in (60) is constrained by the technological and feasibility constraints
(6)-(11) for periods r ≥ t, conditional on xj,t, and implicitly depends on the TRfj,t function that
maps each potential period-t decision d ∈ Df into a sequence of labor demand and goods supply
functions for periods r ≥ t. The expectation in (60) is taken with respect to the wage and price
probability distributions (45) and (46), conditional on xj,t.
For reasons analogous to arguments given above for EO-ADP consumers, the value function (60)
for ﬁrm j can be expressed in the following recursive form:




j,t:3(pt:3, d, t)− wt:1lfj,t:1(wt:1, d, t)
+ βV f
(
Sf (xj,t, d, wt:1, pt:3)
)]
(61)
where the structure of the state transition function Sf does not depend on j or t. Firm j at time t
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is assumed to use a simple linear basis function to estimate the value function V f (xj,t) that solves
(61), as follows:
V f (xj,t) =
∑
z
θpizφz (xj,t) = θ
pi ·M fj,t−1 (62)
where M fj,t−1 denotes the money balance of ﬁrm j at time t.
The following parameters need to be speciﬁed in order to implement the EO-ADP algorithm for
EO-ADP consumers and EO-ADP ﬁrms: the number of runs for the inside and outside estimation
loops; the number of random number draws in an internal maximization algorithm ; the number
of basis functions; the initial parameter value B0 for recursive least squares estimation (dependent
on I = number of consumers); and the initial parameter value θpi,0 for the coeﬃcient in the basis-
function representation of the value function. These parameters are maintained at the ﬁxed values
listed in Table 17 for all EO-ADP agents. The tested values for the two EO-ADP treatment factors,






B0 0.005 · I
θpi,0 1.0
β 0.95
Table 17: Maintained parameter values for EO-ADP agents
C.2 Implementation of the EO-FH Decision Rule
The EO-FH algorithm is a brute-force method for the direct estimation of an optimal solution
in each period t over a ﬁnite rolling forecasting-horizon T . It is performed by EO-FH consumers
and ﬁrms by undertaking a complete search of their ﬁnite decision domains, with a corresponding
evaluation of expected outcomes over the next T periods, in order to determine a decision achieving
the maximum possible expected intertemporal utility or proﬁt outcome over these next T periods.
Thus, in contrast to the EO-ADP algorithm, the EO-FH algorithm does not involve estimation
over an inﬁnite horizon, and it does not involve the use of value functions. Consequently, it is
conceptually simpler and faster to implement than the EO-ADP algorithm.
Speciﬁcally, each EO-FH consumer i at each time t in some state xi,t uses direct search to solve
an optimization problem identical in form to (56) except that the inﬁnite horizon is replaced by
a ﬁnite horizon t + T . Similarly, each non-bankrupt EO-FH ﬁrm j at each time t in some state
xj,t uses direct search to solve an optimization problem identical in form to (60) except that the
inﬁnite horizon is replaced by a ﬁnite horizon t+ T .
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The EO-FH consumers and ﬁrms at each time t use Monte Carlo simulation to calculate the
expectations in their ﬁnite-horizon maximization problems by taking NDrawsFH draws from each
of their estimated probability distributions (45), (46), and (47). The value of the parameter
NDrawsFH is maintained at 10 for all EO-FH agents. The tested values for the three EO-FH
treatment factors T , wm, and grid-type are given in Table 9.
D Social Planner Benchmark Model Solution
This section provides a proof by induction that the Social Planner (SP) Benchmark Model in
reduced representative-consumer form (41) has the following solution: lct:1 = q
c
t:3 = 1 and s
stock
t = 0
for all periods t ≥ 0.
By assumption, sstock−1 = 0. Given this assumption, the social planner's optimal choices for labor,
consumption, and goods stock for period 0 are given by lc0:1 = q
c
0:3 = 1 and s
stock
0 = 0. To establish
this, ﬁrst note that leisure lec0:1 = [1 − lc0:1] has a constant marginal utility equal to 0.5 whereas
goods consumption qc0:3 over the range (0, 1] has a marginal utility that is bounded below by 1.5.
Consequently, the social planner will set lec0:1 = 0 (hence l
c
0:1 = 1). Given the production function
assumptions for the SP Benchmark Model, the maximum amount of good that can be produced
in period 0 is thus 1 unit.
Now suppose the social planner contemplates setting aside a portion sstock0 ∈ [0, 1] of this period-0
production as goods stock for period 1. Given sstock0 , the maximum utility achievable in period 0 by
the representative consumer is 3.0 ln(2−sstock0 ) if sstock0 < 1 and 3.0 ln(0.5) if sstock0 = 1. Also, given
sstock0 , the maximum utility achievable by the representative consumer in period 1 is then attained
by setting lc1:1 = 1, allocating all of the resulting period-1 production of 1 unit of good towards
time-1:3 consumption, and allocating all of the goods stock sstock0 towards time-1:3 consumption,.
From the standpoint of period 0, the resulting maximum utility achievable by the representative
consumer in period 1 is thus given by β[3.0 ln(2 + sstock0 )]. However, since β is less than 1, the sum
of these two maximum achievable utility levels,
3.0 ln(2− sstock0 ) + β ·
[
3.0 ln(2 + sstock0 )
]
, (63)
is a strictly decreasing function of sstock0 over s
stock
0 ∈ [0, 1) (with a discontinuous further jump down
at sstock0 = 1). Consequently, the maximum achievable intertemporal utility for the representative
consumer over periods 0 and 1, considered together, is obtained by setting sstock0 = 0. Similar
arguments can be used to argue that no future use of a positive sstock0 can result in a (discounted)
utility gain for the representative consumer that outweighs his resulting loss of period-0 utility.
Consequently, the social planner should set sstock0 = 0.
Now consider any arbitrary period t ≥ 0 for which the goods stock sstockt−1 is zero. Then the same
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argument used above can be applied to period t to show that the social planner's optimal choices
for period t are to set lct:1 = q
c
t:3 = 1 and s
stock
t = 0. It follows by induction that the optimal
solution to the SP Benchmark Model (41) is lct:1 = q
c
t:3 = 1 and s
stock
t = 0 for all periods t ≥ 0.
E Performance Metrics for Case Comparisons
Let Nk denote any of the tested cases in Table 3. This section describes the various performance
metrics used to evaluate the performance of the DM-Game economy under case Nk.
The primary indicator used to measure ex post performance is u¯k, the average realized single-
period utility attained by the I DM-Game consumers. Using notation introduced in Section 6.1,










I · (LRun− LOmit+ 1) ·NRuns (64)
where uki,τ,r is the utility attained by consumer i in period τ of run r.
Some use is also made of additional performance metrics. For each period τ ∈ {LOmit, . . . ,LRun},









The average value of u¯kτ across the time periods τ ∈ {LOmit, . . . ,LRun} is then given by (64), and

















t− LOmit + 1 (67)
Suppose that a market-clearing wage wkt:1,r and a market-clearing goods price p
k
t:3,r are both well-
deﬁned16 for some period t for all runs r ∈ R∗, where the subset R∗ has cardinality NRuns∗. Then
16Since the demands and supplies of the DM-Game consumers and ﬁrms depend on reservation wages and prices,
there can exist periods for which all of these agents decide not to participate in the labor market and/or the goods
market.
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The average realized real market-clearing wage w¯real,k is then calculated as the average of w¯real,kt
over all periods t for which w¯real,kt is well deﬁned.
Finally, in analogy to (64), the average realized single-period proﬁts attained by the J DM-Game










J · (LRun− LOmit+ 1) ·NRuns (69)
where pikj,τ,r denotes the proﬁt attained by ﬁrm j in period τ of run r.
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